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SCALING UP SOCIAL ENTERPRISE INNOVATIONS:
APPROACHES AND LESSONS

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Abstract:

This paper reviews frameworks and approaches for a systematic process of scaling up successful, sustainable development interventions. A special focus of the paper is how to scale up social enterprise innovations that have demonstrated effective supply of social services for the poorest people in developing countries. The paper provides a menu of approaches that can be used in assessing scaling up potential and in supporting the scaling up process of social enterprises, and it draws lessons from practical experience, including selected case examples. The paper closes with a postscript of implications for external aid donors.

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INTRODUCTION

In 2015 the international community agreed on a set of ambitious sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the global society, to be achieved by 2030. One of the lessons that the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has highlighted is the importance of a systematic approach to identify and sequence development interventions—policies, programs, and projects—to achieve such goals at a meaningful scale.[1] The Chinese approach to development, which consists of identifying a problem and long-term goal, testing alternative solutions, and then implementing those that are promising in a sustained manner, learning and adapting as one proceeds—Deng Xiaoping's "crossing the river by feeling the stones"—is an approach that holds promise for successful achievement of the SDGs.

Having observed the Chinese way, then World Bank Group President James Wolfensohn in 2004, together with the Chinese government, convened a major international conference in Shanghai on scaling up successful development interventions, and in 2005 the World Bank Group (WBG) published the results of the conference, including an assessment of the Chinese approach. (Moreno-Dodson 2005). Some ten years later, the WBG once again is addressing the question of how to support scaling up of successful development interventions, at a time when the challenge and opportunity of scaling up have become a widely recognized issue for many development institutions and experts. (Cooley and Linn 2014)

In parallel with the recognition that scaling up matters, the development community is now also focusing on social enterprises (SEs), a new set of actors falling between the traditionally recognized public and private

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[1] See Johannes F. Linn, "Implementing the SDGs, the Addis Agenda, and Paris COP21 needs a theory of change to address the 'missing middle.' Scaling up is the answer." December 1, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/12/01-scaling-up-sustainable-development-goals-linn.

sectors. We adopt here the World Bank's definition of "social enterprises" as a social-mission-led organization that provides sustainable services to Base of the Pyramid (BoP) populations. This is broadly in line with other existing definitions for the sector[2] and reflects the World Bank's primary interest in social enterprises as a mechanism for supporting service delivery for the poor. Although social enterprises can adopt various organizational forms—business, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and community-based organizations are all forms commonly adopted by social enterprises— they differ from private providers principally by combining three features: operating with a social purpose,

adhering to business principles, and aiming for financial sustainability. Since traditional private and public service providers frequently do not reach the poorest people in developing countries, social enterprises can play an important role in providing key services to those at the "base of the pyramid." (Figure 1)

Social enterprises often start at the initiative of a visionary entrepreneur who sees a significant social need, whether in education, health, sanitation, or microfinance, and who responds by developing an innovative way to address the perceived need, usually by setting up an NGO, or a for-profit enterprise. Social enterpris-

Figure 1. Role of SE sector in public service provision

Source: *Authors.*

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[2] For example, the Social Enterprise Alliance defined a social enterprise as "an organization or initiative that marries the social mission of a non-profit or government program with the market-driven approach of a business." https://socialenterprise.us/about/social-enterprise/.

es and their innovations generally start small. When successful, they face an important challenge: how to expand their operations and innovations to meet the social need at a larger scale.[3]

Development partner organizations—donors, for short—have recognized the contribution that social enterprises can make to find and implement innovative ways to meet the social service needs of people at the base of the pyramid, and they have started to explore how they can support social enterprises in responding to these needs at a meaningful scale.[4]

The purpose of this paper is to present a menu of approaches for addressing the challenge of scaling up social enterprise innovations, based on a review of the literature on scaling up and on social enterprises. The paper does not aim to offer specific recommendations **for entrepreneurs or blueprints and guidelines for the** development agencies. The range of settings, problems, **and solutions is too wide to permit that**. **Rather, the** paper provides an overview of ways to think about and approach the scaling up of social enterprise innova-

tions. Where possible, the paper also refers to specific tools that can be helpful in implementing the proposed approaches.

Note that we talk about scaling up social enterprise innovations, not about social enterprises. This is because it is the innovations and how they are scaled up that matter. An innovation may be scaled up by the social enterprise where it originated, by handoff to a public agency for implementation at a larger scale, or by other **private enterprises, small or large**.[5]

This paper is structured in three parts: Part I presents a general approach to scaling up development interventions. This helps establish basic definitions and concepts. Part II considers approaches for the scaling up of social enterprise innovations. Part III provides a summary of the main conclusions and lessons from experience. A postscript draws out implications for external aid donors. Examples from actual practice are used to exemplify the approaches and are summarized in Annex boxes.

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[3] This challenge is recognized and explored in Chandy et al. (2013). The present paper builds on the analysis and experience collected in that volume.

[4] See Adarsh Desai and Natalia Agapitova, "Innovation and Enterprise: A Driving Force for Social Impact," July 2, 2015. http://blogs.worldbank.org/dmblog/innovation-and-enterprise-driving-force-social-impact.

[5] Another pathway would be to scale social entrepreneurship as such, by improving enabling conditions for a dynamic and innovative social enterprise sector. This could result in a greater number of small-scale innovations adapted to local conditions, which in aggregate reach a large number of beneficiaries. This avenue is not explored in this paper.

PART I: A GENERAL APPROACH TO SCALING UP

Scaling up means, in general and in brief, "expanding, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programs or projects in different places and over time to reach a greater number of people." (Hartmann and Linn 2008a) This definition can be adapted to the specific thematic or sectoral context under consideration.[6]

Scaling up is best viewed as part of an iterative innovation-learning-scaling process. (Figure 2). The simplest version of this process starts with a new idea or innovation, which is tested in a pilot, i.e., a project with limited impact. By monitoring and evaluating delivery of the pilot, knowledge is gathered, which can inform the decision whether and how to scale up for greater impact. During scaling up, more knowledge is gathered, new ideas are generated, and the model is adapted accordingly to suit the scaling up requirements.

Beyond this simple version, various additional features characterize a systematic scaling up approach:

Figure 2. Innovation, Learning, and Scaling Up as an Iterative Process

Source: Adapted from *Linn et al. 2010*

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6 For example, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has adopted this definition: "expanding, adapting and supporting successful policies, programmes and knowledge so that they can leverage resources and partners to deliver larger results for a greater number of rural poor in a sustainable way." (IFAD 2015)

Multiple ideas or models

More than one idea may be explored, tested,[7] **and rated according to their suitability for scaling, with only the** most suitable one(s) chosen. Indeed, this was typically the approach used in China. One way to organize the selection process is through a competition or tournament. (Zinnes 2009)[8] **This is one of the methods of** open innovation, the term that describes the practice of bringing the outside world's ideas, experiences, and expertise into the organization or programs to bolster design or find solutions. (Murray et al. 2010) Governments increasingly use open innovation to: (i) engage larger or nontraditional audiences in the design of public program, and activate support networks; (ii) leverage the expertise of the outside world; and (iii) apply external innovations to internal problems or to open to the outside world a problem they cannot solve.

And the term "innovation" needs to be broadly interpreted to include initiatives that are new only in the context in which they are applied and that can involve a wide variety of innovative aspects, including technological, process, and financing innovation.

Scalability assessment

Whether a single idea or multiple ideas, a scaling up assessment is needed before proceeding. The scalability **assessment should ask whether the model or idea to** be scaled is credible, observable, relevant, better than others, and easy to apply; whether it is compatible with needs, capacities, and resources; and finally whether it is testable. (Figure 3; from ExpandNet 2010) A more detailed assessment tool, based on broadly the same criteria, is also available and shown in Annex 1. (Cooley and Ved, 2012) Scalability is not necessarily a thumbs-up or thumbs-down decision. The assessment can be taken as a checklist for aspects of the model that have to be addressed to make it scalable (e.g., simplifying the approach, finding ways to lower costs and financing requirements, or achieve greater buy-in from relevant **stakeholders).**

Figure 3. Scalability Checklist: "CORRECT"

Credible in that they are based on sound evidence and/or advocated by respected persons or institutions
Observable to ensure that potential users can see the results in practice
Relevant for addressing persistent or sharply felt problems
Relative advantage over existing practices so that potential users are convinced the costs of implementation are warranted by the benefits
Easy to install and understand rather than complex and complicated
Compatible with the potential users' established values, norms and facilities; fits well into the practices of the national program
Testable so that potential users can see the intervention on a small scale prior to large scale adoption

Source: *ExpandNet2010*

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[7] Testing for impact may involve random control trials (RCTs), but RCTs have to be complemented by scalability assessments (see next paragraph and the discussion of monitoring and evaluation below).

[8] The WBG's Development Marketplace competitions are a good framework for identifying scalable innovations among social **enterprises.**

Scaling up pathways—getting from here to there

Scaling up is all about systematically considering how to get from innovation to goal or, vice versa, from goal to innovation. This has been referred to as following a "scaling up pathway." (Cooley and Linn 2014)[9] Scaling up pathways are problem- and context-specific. They have to be flexibly adapted over time as one learns more about the nature of the scale goal (e.g., the number of people not serviced, or the quality standards that need to be achieved) and about the way the innovation works in practice at different scales and in different contexts. However, it helps to have a systematic approach to chart and implement the scaling up pathway. Key determinants of a successful scaling up pathway are that (a) the most important enabling conditions are systematically put into place, (b) intermediate targets are set and progress is monitored, (c) each step is not taken in isolation, but in recognition that it has to create the conditions for a successful next step, and (d) overall the scaling up pathway is effectively implemented, as is each component. Key aspects of the scaling up pathway are shown in Figure 4. The remainder of this part of the paper explores each of these aspects in more depth.

Figure 4. Scaling Up Pathway: Vision of scale and enabling factors

Source: Adapted from *Linn et al. 2010*

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[9] It could also be referred to as "theory of change," although the term "pathway" more vividly describes what is critical: a sequence of steps from innovation to scale goal.

Figure 5. Key Challenges: "Drivers" and "Spaces" for scaling up

Drivers	Spaces/Constraints
• Ideas/solutions • Vision of scale • Leadership/champions • Market demand • Community needs/demand • Incentives and accountability • External catalysts	• Fiscal/financial/costs • Political/ownership • Policies, laws, and regulations • Organizational/institutional • Natural resources • Culture • Security (in fragile states) • Partnership • Learning

Source: Adapted from *Hartmann and Linn 2008*

Enabling conditions

Enabling conditions for the scaling up pathway can be classified into two categories: "drivers," which are required to push the scaling up process forward, and "spaces," which need to be created (or barriers that **need to be removed) to allow initiatives to grow. Based** on actual experience with scaling up, a comprehensive list of potential drivers and spaces/barriers has been **developed. (Figure 5)**[10] This provides a useful checklist for analyzing specific cases or programs of scaling up and for planning particular scaling up pathways. The case of the Alive & Thrive program, which was designed to combat undernutrition through improved infant and young child feeding practices and was implemented by BRAC, the well-known NGO in Bangladesh, provides a good example of how key drivers (ideas, leadership, external catalysts, incentives) and spaces (financial, policy, institutional, learning) were put in place in support of successful scaling up. (See Annex Box A1)

Monitoring and evaluation

During implementation it is important to monitor the delivery of the intervention and to evaluate the impact in terms of intended outcomes. Ideally, the impact assessment would use a randomized controlled trial (RCT); however, this may often not be feasible or affordable, in which case more traditional "before-and-after" or qualitative evaluations of impact will have to be used. In any case, RCTs are not sufficient, since for scaling up it is also necessary to monitor and evaluate whether and how the relevant drivers and spaces are being developed in a way that supports a successful scaling up pathway.

Sequencing projects and programs along the scaling up pathway

Development interventions are typically planned and implemented as time-bound projects or programs, i.e.,

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[10] A list of drivers and spaces with annotations in provided in Annex 2. The list is adapted from Hartmann and Linn (2008a), Linn et al. (2010), Chandy and Linn (2011), and Cooley and Linn (2014).

Figure 6. Project Sequencing for Scaling Up

Source: *Cooley and Linn 2014*

with limited duration, resources, and expected impact. In developing projects and programs, it is critical to think of each of them as part of a sequence of steps along the scaling up pathway, where each project or **program is designed to help build the platform of en-abling factors (drivers and spaces)** that facilitate subsequent steps along the pathway. (Figure 6)

Five additional aspects are important in this connection:

a. **It is important to assess and support the sustain-ability** of the impact for each project and program if one wishes to develop a sustainable scaling up pathway.

b. Scaling up considerations needs to be part of project design from the outset.

c. For each project, the results framework needs to establish interim targets for impact and for drivers and spaces related to the overall scale target to be achieved over the full scaling up pathway.

d. In planning a scaling up pathway, the question needs to be considered whether the initiative is ultimately to be scaled up and sustained in the public or the private sector. Which one is preferable **will depend on the nature of the innovation and on** the context.

Figure 7. The Problem with the Last Mile Beneficiaries

Source: **Adapted from** *Cooley and Linn 2014, based on Rogers 2003*

e. Economies of scale, learning, institutional development, and constituency building should permit an accelerated impact curve as shown in Figure 7; but there may be a leveling off with diminishing returns, difficulties in reaching late adopters, or, in short, difficulties in reaching the last mile.[11]

The adoption curve on Figure 7 also illustrates that the process of change can become self-generating within a population of users: community, region, or a segment of population. To expand the reach to other—often isolated—groups of customers, however, requires persistent efforts for penetration of these new markets—along with substantial resources to sustain those efforts.

A systematic focus on planning and implementation

In considering each stage of the scaling up pathway, and for the pathway as a whole, effective planning and implementation are essential. To help with the planning and implementation process, Cooley and Ved (2012) developed a three-step, 10-task approach (Figure 8), supported with detailed guidelines and tools for design and implementation. The three steps involve (i) developing a scaling up plan, (ii) establishing the preconditions for scaling up, and (iii) implementing the scaling up process, consistent with the drivers and spaces approach laid out above. The Cooley and Ved framework offers a useful set of management tools for practical application in developing and implementing a scaling up pathway for specific interventions.

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[11] Figure 6 represents a frequently used graph to demonstrate a typical diffusion process of commercially driven technological innovations. It is attributed to Everett Rogers. (Rogers 2003)

Figure 8. Planning and Implementing a Scaling Up Pathway

Step 1: Develop a scaling-up plan

Task 1: Create a vision
Task 2: Assess scalability
Task 3: Fill information gaps
Task 4: Prepare a scaling-up plan

Step 2: Establish the preconditions for scaling up

Task 5: Legitimize change
Task 6: Build a constituency
Task 7: Realign and mobilize the needed resources

Step 3: Implement the scaling up process

Task 8: Modify organizational structures
Task 9: Coordinate action
Task 10: Track performance and maintain momentum

Source: *Cooley and Ved 2012*

Consistency with other approaches to delivering development results

The innovation-learning-scaling up framework presented above is consistent with core aspects of three other approaches to development effectiveness, although they do not focus specifically on scaling up:

• The WBG's recently developed approach to the *"Science of Delivery"* uses a case study approach to identify common barriers to effective delivery of development interventions and how to overcome them. The barriers include institutional, political, behavioral, and logistical obstacles, as well as fragmentation among levels of government, limited staff capacity, and misaligned incentives.[12] These are all factors of concern in the above scaling up framework, and the WBG's Science of Delivery team explicitly included scaling up dimensions in its case study analysis.[13] As and when this work is

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[12] For more information about the WBG's science of delivery approach, as implemented in the Global Delivery Initiative, see http://www.worldbank.org/reference/GDI/index.html.

[13] See Global Delivery Initiative, "Delivery Case Study Guidelines," World Bank, September 2015. http://www.worldbank.org/reference/GDI/pdfs/Guidelines24September.pdf.

completed, it will provide useful insights on specific delivery challenges and solutions in scaling up development initiatives.

- The WBG also developed the *Capacity Development Results Framework* (CDRF), which analyzes the enabling factors for effective institutional capacity, one of the key spaces needed for scaling up. The CDRF emphasizes collective action challenges across organizations, institutions, and the overall sociopolitical environment that can be addressed by knowledge and learning interventions. (Otoo et al. 2009)

- Finally, experts at Harvard University, the Center for Global Development, and the WBG recently developed the *Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation* (PDIA) approach. It posits that the best approach to effective development interventions is problem-driven, with experimentation and adaptation, learning, and partnerships, and with a focus on political viability and practical implementability—all key aspects of the scaling up approach presented above. (Andrews et al., 2012)

PART II: APPROACHES TO SCALING UP SOCIAL ENTERPRISE INNOVATION

The general scaling up framework presented in Part I applies also to the challenge of scaling up social enterprises (SE) innovations in developing countries. As shown in Figure 1 above, the key actors in providing services to the poor at the base of the pyramid (BoP) are the government and the SEs. To address the service needs of the poor, each of these actors should aim to scale up its activities. In doing so they can be guided by the general scaling up framework in asking the following questions:

- What is the service problem at the BoP, and what is the ultimate scale goal to be pursued?

- What is the innovation of service provision to be scaled up? Is it scalable?

- What is an appropriate scaling up pathway to reach the scale goal?

- What are the relevant drivers and spaces along the pathway?

- How to best plan, sequence, and implement interventions, projects, and programs along the scaling up pathway?

- How to monitor and evaluate progress along the pathway and flexibly adjust it based on what we learn?

While the government and SEs each provide services that could be scaled up, important interactions between the government and the SEs affect their respective scaling up pathways. As a result governments

and SEs need to scale up recognizing this interdependence—and preferably do so in a mutually consistent and cooperative manner, with donor support as needed and appropriate. (Chandy et al. 2013) Annex Box A2 provides an example of a donor-supported program in Bosnia-Herzegovina, under which municipalities provide funding on a competitive basis to local social enterprises for the provision of municipal social services. The program was successfully scaled up countrywide and is now being scaled up regionally in the Western Balkans, but it faces considerable challenges especially in terms of fiscal sustainability, should donor funding be terminated.

In the remainder of this part of the paper we review different aspects of this interaction and of potential cooperation between government and SEs. We first analyze scaling up of social enterprise innovations in the context of the delivery chain of service provision. We then consider the dynamics of scaling up with respect to timing and sequencing along the scaling up pathway. This is followed by an analysis of incentives and accountabilities, as they help drive the scaling up process for social enterprise innovations. And finally, we look at the role of monitoring and evaluation. Throughout this part, we focus specifically on the role of SEs in providing social services (such as education, health, water and sanitation, microcredit, and communications) at the BoP.

Scaling up SE innovations as part of a service delivery chain

Value chain analysis has become an important part of development analysis and policy in many areas, especially for the industrial and agricultural sectors. It also is a valuable tool for understanding how to scale up services.[14] Figure 8 illustrates key elements of the

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[14] The analysis in this section draws on Koh et al. (2014).

value chain as they relate to service providers in general: (a) the firm that provides the service, (b) the value chain itself (the inputs and output chain for the firm's products or services), (c) the public goods, especially infrastructure, that the firm requires to conducts its business, and (d) the government's policies, laws, and regulations that affect the firm's ability to do business.[15]

One can then analyze the actual or potential obstacles and barriers that firms have to overcome in expanding their activities under the four components of the overall value chain, as listed in the bottom half of Figure 9.[16] An example of an application of this framework to the case of primary health case delivery and outreach is given in Annex Box A3.

Figure 9. The SE Value Chain Components & Potential Barriers to Scaling Up

Firm	Value Chain	Public Goods	Government
• Weak business model	• Lack of suitable labor/inputs	• Lack of customer, producer, or channel awareness of new market-based solution and appreciation of its benefits	• Inhibitory laws, regulations, and procedures
• Weak proposition to customers/producers	• Weak sourcing and distributions channels from/to BoP	• Lack of market information and industry know-how, e.g., customer insight, business models	• Inhibitory taxes and subsidies
• Weak leadership	• Weak linkage between BoP producers and end demand		• Adverse intervention by politicians or officials
• Lack of managerial and technical skills	• Lack of financing for customers, distributors, and producers	• Absence or ineffectiveness of standards, e.g., for quality	
• Lack of capital	• Lack of support service providers	• Lack of hard infrastructure	

Source: *Koh et al. 2014*

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[15] The dividing lines between these four categories are not hard and fast. For example, infrastructure services represent inputs to the firm's production and thus could be represented as part of the value chain; moreover, government is responsible for much of the infrastructure. However, for the purposes of scaling up analysis, this categorization can be helpful.

[16] The list of barriers in Figure 9 can be mapped easily into the list of drivers and spaces shown in Figure 5 above. Indeed, the list of drivers and spaces is a useful cross-check for the completeness of the list of potential barriers. For example, depending on the nature of the intervention, natural resource constraints could be binding.

Many of the firm internal barriers, such as a weak product or business model, weak leadership, and lack of managerial skills, have to be addressed by the firms themselves.[17] However, firms can also act to overcome some of the barriers in the value chain and public goods, for example, by training their labor, strengthening their distribution channels, and working to increase customer awareness. Many of these constraints could also be addressed by firm associations acting on behalf of all firms.

Government in turn has to enact appropriate policies, **laws, and regulations, but it also is involved in the provision** of infrastructure and market information, in removing constraints affecting the value chain (such as ensuring well-trained labor and improving financing for customers, distributors, and producers), and even in helping to address some of the internal constraints affecting the firms, e.g., by offering managerial training and improving access to capital. At times, the best governmental policy may be to get out of the way of private business and social enterprise, as was the case **with the development of mobile phone-based banking** services for the poor in Kenya. (See the case study on M-PESA in Box A4.)

Where the service delivery firms are SEs, special considerations apply, with a particular focus on the delivery chain, rather than the value chain (in Figure 8 above). The key difference is the firm's business objective: a focus on profit and value creation for an individual firm or organization in the value chain analysis,

versus focus on delivering (social) value for the beneficiary in the delivery chain analysis. The latter is more useful for understanding BoP markets served by SEs, where the client (often a government agency paying for basic services) and the beneficiary (often poor customers unable to pay) are separated.

For SEs the value chain is based not only on analysis of profits, but also on analysis of the social value created. As a result, there are even more barriers to scale for SEs compared with (exclusively) profit-driven businesses, because SEs must consider their delivery chain from both a monetary value-generating aspect and a social value generation aspect. Profit-driven businesses can truncate their activities when return on investment decreases. Reaching customers at the BoP requires a very special sort of business, i.e., one with a social purpose that will drive the frontier of delivery even when **the return of investment might be suboptimal. (Polak and Warwick 2013)** In doing so, SEs often face a tough balancing act between sustainability and social impact. Scaling becomes difficult if the delivery chain is costly and complex and where the SE is not embedded in the delivery system with other partners.[18]

One of the main benefits of the delivery chain approach (as an adaptation of the value chain approach) to scaling up SE innovations is that it clearly identifies the **interrelationship between SEs and government: SEs have to be aware of and seek to work with or around** the barriers created by government action or inaction. Governments need to remove barriers (and help cre-

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[17] The World Business Council for Sustainable Development in its report on scaling up inclusive business identifies three critical internal barriers (opportunity cost of investment, strategic and operational misalignment, and capability gaps) and proposes solutions to help address them. (WBCSD 2013)

[16] One of the trends emerging from the World Bank's ecosystem diagnostics for SEs in Africa and South Asia and from the World Bank's business model innovations database is that the social enterprise often engage as "connectors" in the delivery chains to the poor. They find gaps in delivery chains (which often involve government and profit-driven businesses) and identify innovative ways to bridge those gaps. The greater the gaps in the delivery chain, the more difficult is for the SEs to effectively address them.

ate space or opportunities), if SEs are to function and to fill the gaps in social service provision at the BoP. Moreover, governments are often key clients for SEs by supplying the funding needed to provide services to beneficiaries at the BoP. In other words, both SEs and governments have a role to play in ensuring that the drivers and spaces are in place to permit SEs to scale up scalable interventions. For example, champions, incentives, and accountability are needed in both SEs and government, and financial (or fiscal), institutional, political, and ownership space has to be created for both, while policy and regulatory space is of relevance to both, even as it is up to government primarily to address such obstacles. Developing and sustaining successful SE-government partnerships are not easy, as the examples of a Roma education program in Serbia (summarized in Annex Box A5) and a microfinance scheme in Afghanistan (see Annex Box A6) demonstrate. Throughout the scaling up process, various key drivers and spaces have to be put in place, and they have to be sustained (including the vital political support) if the scaled up programs are to be sustained.

The dynamics of scaling up SE innovations

As with scaling up in general, scaling up of SE innovations involves important questions around timing and sequencing of the scaling up pathway. The typical technology diffusion pathway shown in Figure 6 above is a good place to start considering the dynamic aspects of the scaling up of SE innovations. While spontaneous diffusion of technological innovation may occur, that is not the rule; even for standard consumer good innovations, producers develop elaborate marketing strategies to create demand and match these with expansion strategies on the supply side. Similarly, for social service innovations, markets have to be created and supply chains organized. Kubzansky (2013) considers business model scalability and time requirements for

scaling SE innovation in terms of four factors affecting the shape of the "cumulative population" S-shaped curve in Figure 7:

(a) *Supply push and demand pull*: **where there is** demand pull, diffusion or scaling up tends to be **easier than where diffusion has to be pushed from** the supply side.

(b) *The maturity of the innovation, cost of service production, and capacity of the SE to deliver*: **the** less mature, the higher the cost of production; and the lower the capacity of the SE, the longer it will take to scale up.

(c) *Whether the innovation requires development of new marketing channels or whether existing marketing channels can be used to reach the consumers or recipients*: **the latter allows more rapid** scaling than the former.

(d) *Rural versus urban*: generally scaling up in urban areas can be more rapid than in rural areas, since diffusion of knowledge is less costly and more rapid in high-density and well-connected (including through information and communication technology) urban areas, and since the employment opportunities and social mobility for the poor tend **to be greater in urban than in rural areas**.

In designing the scaling up pathways for SE innovations, it is important to take these factors into consideration.

A particularly difficult stage in the scaling up process is the early phase of the S-shaped curve in Figure 6. In the literature on commercial startups, this is at times referred to as the "valley of death." (Figure 10)

A similar challenge applies for SEs. During the startup phase, the resources of the SE tend to be limited and

risking exhaustion, as the investment and operating costs tend to be high, while benefits, revenue, public visibility, and political support are low. Over time, if the innovation is scalable, costs will come down, benefits will accrue, and revenue can be generated, as public recognition and political support are mobilized around successful SE initiatives.

The critical question, then, is how the SE innovation can be nurtured to cross the so-called valley of death. One way to look at this is to characterize the early **phase of SE innovations as involving a one-time (or fixed) cost** of establishing the innovation as impactful and viable. Once impact and viability have been established, society at large benefits, so that, in effect, SEs create through their innovations what economists refer to as a "public good." (Chandy et al. 2013, Kubzansky 2013) This justifies financial support or subsidies for the startup phase. For startups in the private sector, financial support is provided by venture capitalists or at times by governments. For the SE innovations at the BoP in developing countries, governments and external donors (official aid agencies or NGOs, including foundations) need to provide subsidies or find other means of sharing costs and risks, supplemented by efforts to help create requisite drivers and spaces needed for scaling up, especially during the early phase(s) of the scaling up pathway. In the case of the hugely successful scaling up of mobile phone payment services, M-PESA, in Kenya, a £1 million grant from the UK Department **for International Development (DfID) provided the** upfront financing that helped overcome the valley of death. (See Annex Box A4)

Figure 10. "The Valley of Death for Scale"?

Source: Adapted from *Murphy and Edwards 2003*

However, a donor-driven subsidy approach to the early stage of SE innovation carries risks: donors tend **to have their own agendas, and the SE innovations** are easily "captured" by donor agendas when donors promise cheap capital. Moreover, the availability of donor funding can deflect SE creation and creativity into areas that are not necessarily the most important for the local poor. Another issue is cost: to access cheap sources of funding, social enterprises launch grant-raising activities, where they often devote the most qualified managerial time. This deflects energy from their core activities. Also, donors frequently impose cumbersome measurement and evaluation requirements, driven by specific donor reporting needs, rather than by the business needs of the SE or the needs of the beneficiary population.[19] Finally, government and SE dependency on donor funding can have a corrosive effect on the ability and willingness of aid recipients to find a path to financial sustainability. Donors therefore need to find ways to wean governments from their support, **and governments need to either wean SEs from** grant funding or find ways to provide long-term budget support, where the case for government funding of social services is clearly established.[20]

Another aspect of the dynamics of the scaling up pathway for SE innovations involves the sequencing of interactions between government and SEs. As noted in discussing the interaction between SEs and government, scaling up usually involves not only the "horizontal" replication and expansion of an SE innovation across a wider geography to more people, but also "vertical" scaling up, i.e., the involvement of government institutions with their various policy, legal, regulatory, financial, and other instruments that need to be mobilized in support of the scaling up pathway. Nongovernmental institutions (business associations and other civil society organizations, so-called "enablers" of the SE ecosystem) may also provide umbrella support to **SEs serving the BoP.**

One way to characterize different sequencing options in this interaction of horizontal and vertical aspects of the scaling up pathway is by reference to Figure 11. It shows potential interactions between national- ("macro") and intermediate- (or "meso") level institutions with "local"-level SEs: The vertical arrows show that interaction can be from the bottom up or from the top down (or both) in ensuring that the necessary enabling conditions are created to support the scaling up of SE innovations (as symbolized by the blue horizontal arrow). For traditional government-led social service initiatives, a pilot at the local level may be organized by meso- or macro-level government authorities.

In contrast, for SE innovations, initiatives typically start with pilots at the local level. They are either picked up by entities at the meso or national levels, which support the replication at the local level (see, for example, the microcredit project in Rwanda, summarized in Annex Box A7), or alternatively local-level diffusion leads to a recognition and appropriate institutional and policy change at the meso and national levels for continued expansion around the large oval cycle (see, for example, a rural energy demand program in Nepal, also summarized in Annex Box A7).[21]

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[19] Similar risks arise when SE startups are supported by governments.

[20] The case of municipal funding for SEs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, summarized in Annex Box A2, is an example of how sustainability of donor-funded municipal support for SEs faces serious risks of sustainability, even though the program was successfully scaled up.

[21] In both cases external donor agencies provided support for the scaling up process.

Figure 11. Horizontal and Vertical Scaling up Must be Effectively Combined and Sequenced

Source: **Adapted from** *UNDP "Guidance Note" 2013*

A final option is for government at the national or meso level to take over implementation of the innovation **through its own ministries and departments**. If **this** is not carefully planned and executed, however, it can run into difficulties (see the example of failed educational reform in Kenya, summarized in Annex Box A8). In analyzing the experience with cases of successful (or failed) scaling up pathways, it is useful to learn what sequencing took place and why. In planning scaling up pathways, similarly, consideration of the appropriate sequencing and timing of horizontal and vertical scaling up will be important.

Incentives for scaling up SE innovations

Incentives are one of the key drivers of scaling up in general, and specifically so for social enterprises. A full exploration of the role of incentives in scaling up is provided in Linn (2013). Here we offer a summary of the arguments, as they apply to the scaling up of innovative SE services at the BoP. The framework of incentives and accountability draws on *World Development Report 2004* (World Bank 2003), which **presented a triangular relationship between the state**, service providers, and citizens as shown in Figure 12.[22] The arrows in the graph reflect the flow of incentives (or accountability). Citizens (in democratic societies) vote for politicians who set policies; politicians have bureaucratic or contractual relations with service providers to deliver services. This is called the long route of accountability. It contrasts with the short route of accountability, under which citizens as recipients have client power vis-à-vis providers. As pointed out in World Bank (2003) and Linn (2013), there are many reasons that the long and short routes of accountability may not work well in general, and specifically for scaling up. Among them: weak democratic processes, poor administrative capacity and corruption along the long route, and the lack of empowerment of beneficiaries to hold providers accountable along the short route.

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[22] Both graphs are simplified, in not reflecting explicitly the meso level of government agencies shown in Figure 11.

Figure 12. Short & Long Routes of Incentives & Accountability

Source: *Linn 2013*

Linn (2013) identifies eight specific incentive instruments that can help make the short and long route of accountability work better and thus help drive the scaling up process forward. Each of the eight incentive instruments is identified by a number in Figure 12. The first four instruments are along the long route, while three are incentives along the short route of accountability. The eighth of the instruments refer to the internal management of the providers. Let us briefly see how each of these instruments applies to the case where the providers are SEs:[23]

(1) *National and sectoral strategies* (should) set overall directions for government engagement in social service provision and serve as a guide-post for ministries. In this context the role of SEs should be clearly identified and instruments and **targets for engagement between government and**

agencies laid out with the explicit goal of seeking scaled up results.

(2) *Incentive grants* from national- to meso-level government agencies or directly to the SE providers stimulate scaled up service.

(3) *Contracts* offering payment for services from government to SE service providers are a special form of incentive relationship, with results-based (rather than input-based) contractual payments especially effective in providing incentives for scaled up delivery.[24]

(4) *Grants and contracts* may be awarded through *competitions* and thus select SE providers judged most effective. As Zinnes (2009) points out, this can result in incentives for scaling up not just to

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[23] For a fuller discussion of each instrument see Linn (2013), including experience with each of them and some of the practical **issues of implementation.**

[24] Social impact bonds (SIBs) involve a version of this kind of instrument, but in this case a social impact investor fronts the working capital for the SE provider and is repaid by the state agency (or a not-for profit funder) upon successful delivery of service results. (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2015)

the winners of the competition, but to all who participate.[25] **The UN Development Programme has** used competitive grant allocation widely in supporting scaling up of local government initiatives, including support for local governments in allocating grants to social enterprises for the provision of local public services. (See Annex Box A2)

(5) *Subsidies* **from providers, government, or donors** to service recipients involve incentives that generate demand for the service along the short route of accountability. Of course, the subsidies have to be financed by either the provider or by other funders. Financial/fiscal space may turn out to be a binding constraint to scaling up.

(6) *Community empowerment* is designed to create community level demand for services and for communities to hold providers, including SE service providers, accountable for reaching out to underserviced communities.

(7) *Public information and citizens'* feedback about the extent and quality of service provision, e.g., feedback mechanisms such as the citizen report card developed in India in the 1990s and since **then also elsewhere,**[26] can be a powerful instrument to hold service providers accountable for scaling up quality social services.

(8) *Internal incentives* **inside the provider institutions**, specifically incentives for front-line staff, are critical to achieve effective delivery of scaled up social services by SEs. Effective leadership within the institutions, proper structuring of staff rewards and **penalties, and internal monitoring and evaluation** of delivery will be essential to achieve this.

These incentive mechanisms can be deployed in combination with each other as, for example, in the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) program in Afghanistan, which used performance-based partnership agreements between the Ministry of Public Health and competitively selected NGOs. (See Annex Box A9)

Monitoring and evaluation for scaling up SE innovations

As with all scaling up efforts, it is critical to monitor **and evaluate progress with SE innovations, in terms** of their impact and whether the key enabling conditions (drivers and spaces) are put in place. A number of special considerations apply specifically in the case **of SEs.**

- Randomized control trials are in principle im**portant tools for assessing whether the SE inno**vation and its scaled up implementation achieve the desired impact.[27] However, many SEs will not be able to design, implement, and finance RCTs. They therefore need support from outside actors to carry out RCTs. The best way to proceed may well be to carry out in-depth evaluations such as RCTs not on a universal, enterprise-by-enterprise basis, but to do so on a selective, representative **basis.**

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[25] Challenge funds, which provide competitive grants for innovation and scaling, such as the Global Innovation Fund (GIF), are recent donor initiatives to provide incentives and funding for scaling up. For the GIF, see http://www.globalinnovation.fund. The grant to M-PESA from a DfID challenge fund was a key factor in getting this successful scaling up initiative started. (See Annex Box A4)

[26] See, for example, World Bank (no date) for an account of the application of the External Implementation Status and Results Plus (E-ISR+) system as a feedback, transparency, and accountability tool of the WBG.

[27] Annex Box A8 reports on the application of the RCT method to the scaling up initiative of an NGO-led education reform initiative in Kenya.

- Moreover, as previously noted, RCTs are not enough; the progress with the creation of enabling conditions also needs to be monitored and evaluated throughout the scale up process.

- Monitoring and evaluation play a critical function in generating accountability and with it incentives for the provider, not only monitoring internally in the SE, as noted in the preceding section, but just as importantly monitoring and evaluation on an ongoing basis for accountability of the provider (and of state agencies).[28]

- Monitoring and evaluation requirements—especially when imposed by donors with a view to meet their own bureaucratic reporting requirements, rather than for effective management, learning, and accountability by the SE—can easily become unduly burdensome, as noted. Keeping measurement and evaluation processes simple and focused on the learning needs of SEs will be especially important in the early stages of scaling up of SE innovation.

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[28] In the case of social impact bonds, independent evaluation is an integral part of the contractual relationship established between provider, investor, and funder and is critical to the functioning of the instrument. (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2015) There is, however, an inherent tension between the accountability and learning functions of monitoring and evaluation. The more the process is used as an accountability instrument for the provider agency and its staff, the less likely it is going to be used by the provider and staff as a learning tool, since more effort will be devoted to obtaining (and arguing about) the appropriate rating than to learning the lessons of what worked well and what did not.

PART III: CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

This paper has presented a number of complementary frameworks and approaches for scaling up SE innovations. These approaches are best thought of **as a menu of options to be drawn on for the design**, implementation, and evaluation of projects and programs that could or do involve scaling up.

In addition to presenting such a menu of approaches, we draw the following lessons for scaling up SE innovations from the scaling up and SE literature and experience:

- Systematic scaling up of successful development interventions will be critical for the achievement of the SDGs in general, and scaling up of SE innovations in particular can support achievement of SDGs, especially those that involve getting social services to beneficiaries at the base of the pyramid. (British Council et al., 2015)

- Past experience with systematic scaling up shows that it involves an iterative process of innovation, learning, and scaling up, where the learning experience in the scaling up process feeds back through innovation into adaptation, which helps to further strengthen a sustainable scaling up process.

- The innovation-learning-scaling up process can best be thought of as involving a scaling up pathway over time from innovative idea to a scale vision that corresponds to a well-defined **development goal, or from goal to program of interventions**. The development goal could be linked to an SDG or could be defined as reaching certain access targets to specific social services for beneficiaries **at the BoP.**

- In designing and implementing a scaling up pathway it helps to think systematically about how to create an enabling environment with the necessary drivers and spaces that we summarized in this paper based on prior experience.

- For scaling up SE innovations one can think in terms of a service delivery chain, which involves firm-level factors, delivery (or value) chain conditions, and public goods, as well as governmental action, such as contracting, regulation, and the like. The enabling factors, especially barriers that **need to be removed, but also drivers that have to** be in place, can be identified for each of these four sets of factors or conditions along the delivery chain.

- Throughout the SE delivery chain, it will be important to think in terms of the interaction, and **often the need for partnership, between SEs and** government, since generally neither the SEs nor the government can effectively scale up service delivery to the BoP by going it alone.

- The proper sequencing of horizontal and vertical scaling up—the former involving replication across SEs, **the latter the engagement of different levels** of government and other supportive institutions—will vary from sector to sector and from case to case, but consideration of what is the most appropriate sequencing under the given circumstances **should be part of the planning and implementation** process when scaling up SE innovations.

- Monitoring and evaluation of progress along the scaling up pathway is essential, not only by focusing on intermediate outcome benchmarks, but also by ascertaining whether the appropriate enabling conditions are being put in place so as to ensure that progress is sustainable and that the next step along the pathway can be taken effectively.

- Scaling up SE innovations in a sustainable manner will take time, and it is not easy. SEs need to fill important gaps in the delivery chain of services to the BoP, and they have to do so in a way that reconciles commercial and social viability objectives that often pull in opposite directions. Moreover, governments are subject to many conflicting and changing priorities, as some of the examples provided in the Annex boxes have documented. As a result, the important partnerships between SEs and government are unfortunately often short-lived, and their scaling up process—or the scaled up intervention—is unsustainable. This underscores the importance of (a) a thorough understanding of the political economy of change in the country concerned, including winners and losers and how they will react, (b) documenting convincing evidence on the success of SE innovations, and (c) outreach to a wide range of stakeholders to create a lasting coalition of interests in support of the scaled up program.

Postscript: Implications for aid donors

Through their financial and technical support donors often exert strong leverage over what the recipients in developing countries do or do not do, and how they do it. For this reason alone, donors have a special responsibility for supporting scaling up. (Hartmann and Linn 2008b)

Unfortunately, in practice donors tend to focus on new initiatives rather than scaling up. Donors come and go, and their interventions are too often small, short-lived, or one-off or some combination of those. Donors tend to focus on specific projects and their results frameworks, which measure inputs or outputs, and they rarely consider projects as steppingstones along a longer-term scaling up pathway. Collectively, donor activities are highly fragmented. And few donors build systematic, lasting partnerships with local or external partners. There are, of course, exceptions, but the general pattern has been such that donor interventions do not support scaling up successful development interventions. (Linn 2011) In this way donors reinforce the tendency of national actors to focus on short-term, one-off initiatives, rather than on systematic scaling up. In short, they all too often contravene the first law of effective assistance, which postulates: "Do no harm."

Fortunately, donors are becoming more aware of the need to focus systematically on scaling up, which is reflected in initiatives, including special programs, such as Save the Children's Signature Program,[29] in the establishment of units in donor organizations or cooperative ventures that focus on the entire innovation-learning-scaling up cycle, such as the WBG's Social Enterprise Innovations Unit and the Global Innovation Fund (GIF),[30] and in the fact that a few donors are making efforts to mainstream scaling up into their operational activities more generally. (See, e.g., IFAD 2015)[31] In many of these initiatives, the scaling up of SE innovations plays an important role.

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[29] See http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0-df91d2eba74a%7D/INVESTINGINIMPACT_STRATEGICPLAN.PDF

[30] See http://www.globalinnovation.fund

[31] Management Systems International (MSI) and the Results for Development Institute (R4D) recently organized a Community of Practice on Scaling Up, which engages multilateral and bilateral aid donors, foundations, think tanks, and academics in exchanging information, experience, and approaches to scaling up on a regular and systematic basis. See http://www.msiworldwide.com/2015/02/scaling-up-community-of-practice-launched/ .

As donors now begin to focus systematically on sustainable development impact at scale, what are some of the implications of past experience with scaling up efforts? We briefly summarize the main lessons:[32]

- It is critical that donors focus squarely on the entire innovation-learning-scaling cycle as a coherent whole, rather than only on one aspect (especially innovation) or on each aspect separately, as has been the tendency in the past.

- Donors need to find ways to connect their and their recipients' lofty high-level development goals (such as articulated in the SDGs and national plans) with the projects and programs that they support. The only way to do this effectively is to break the high-level goals into sectoral and even subsectoral targets on a country-by-country basis and then develop scaling up pathways for each of the business lines in which a donor is active.

- In doing so, donors always need to remember that their principal focus should be on supporting the innovation-learning-scaling cycle that is carried out by their partners in the country concerned, rather than on implementing the scaling up process themselves.

- Today's donors rightly seek ways to increase the financial leverage of their resources; in doing so they need to recognize that it is not only, or even principally, through financial engineering that

they obtain leverage, but it is through supporting a scaling up process that leads to sustained impact potentially much greater than the limited financial resources that they deploy themselves. A key ingredient for successful leverage is to find ways to create incentives for actors in the country to pursue the scale goal.

- Donors rightly insist on clearly specified results frameworks for the projects they support, but they need to realize that a results framework that is supportive of scaling up is one that not only considers the impact of the project on the beneficiaries generated by the project, but also asks whether key enabling conditions for scaling up beyond the project have been put in place.[33]

- When supporting SE innovations and their scaling up, donors need to understand the ecosystem of SEs in the country and sector in which they are engaged. This means that they have to support sound analysis of what is the landscape of SE innovations (i.e., the what and the who) and to what extent the enabling conditions are in place to support SEs in playing their role in filling gaps in the delivery chain for scaled up services to the BoP.

- Donors need to recognize that effective linkages and partnerships between SEs and government agencies are a critical success factor for scaling up. In tailoring their support, this linkage and need for partnership requires full attention. For donor

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[32] Many of these lessons are based on the experience with a multiyear effort by a Brookings Institution team to assist IFAD with introducing a systematic scaling up approach in its operational work. (Linn et al. 2010, and Hartmann et al. 2013) For lessons on how to mainstream a focus on scaling up in aid organizations, see Linn 2016.

[33] Some donors in the past have focused on capacity building as one of the project objectives. If capacity is broadly understood to encompass not only some narrow dimensions of institutional or organizational capacity, but if it also includes the broad range of enabling factors (drivers and spaces) addressed in this paper, in support of scaling up, then there is a close link between capacity building and scaling up, as noted above in the World Bank's Capacity Development Results Framework (Otoo et al. 2009).

agencies that are used to working primarily with SEs (such as NGOs and foundations), as well as for those that are used to working primarily with government entities (such as the multilateral development banks), **bridging the gap between SEs and governments** may not come easily, but it is a task that has to be very consciously pursued.

- In pursuing scaling up, and specifically in pursuing scaling up of SE innovations, donors should aim to work not only through narrowly isolated units within donor organizations, but also find ways to mainstream scaling up as a mindset and a fundamental approach into all their operational work, including their overarching corporate strategies, operational policies and processes, management and staff performance incentives, and monitoring **and evaluation methods**.

- Scaling up in general, and scaling up of SE innovations in particular, is hard, takes time, and requires much patience, willingness to take risks, readiness to search for and recognize what does not work as much as what works, and the ability to adjust and respond flexibly to the lessons being learned along the scaling up pathway.

- Finally, in developing operational scaling up processes for the design and implementation of projects, and for monitoring and evaluation, donor organizations need to resist the temptation to introduce complex bureaucratic approaches. Instead, operational procedures should be kept as simple as possible, if they are to find widespread and effective application in operational practice.[34]

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[34] One example, among many, of an excessively complex operational approach is social cost-benefit analysis, which explicitly weighted the costs and benefits according to the income level of the population stratum incurring or receiving them. See Squire and van der Tak (1975). This approach, while thought to be very promising at the time of its introduction, never took **hold in operational development work**.

Box A1. Drivers and spaces in scaling up the Alive & Thrive program in Bangladesh

"Alive & Thrive (A&T) seeks to develop scaled-up models for preventing child undernutrition by improving IYCF [infant and young child feeding] practices. Funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, A&T's interventions focus on achieving behavior change through existing service-delivery platforms, especially the health worker network of BRAC, the largest nongovernmental organization in Bangladesh. This [box] focuses on A&T's use of BRAC's Essential Health Care (EHC) program in 2009–2011 as its operational platform. During this time, 9,000 managers, mid-level staff, workers, and volunteers were trained in interpersonal counseling, and an IYCF-oriented social mobilization strategy reached 15 million people.

"The drivers of scale for A&T in Bangladesh included ideas and models from former successes in breastfeeding and complementary feeding programs and endorsement of proven, high-impact IYCF programs. Visionary leaders at BRAC, A&T, and the Gates Foundation, with the encouragement of the government's nutrition leadership, drove the scaling-up process forward. In the aftermath of the dismantling of Bangladesh's National Nutrition Program, in part due to its limited scale, the search for a better option worked as an external catalyst. The Gates Foundation's "learning grant" program acted as an incentive, as it required a high level of accountability for results at scale.

"The enabling environment or spaces for scale were created in several ways. Adequate funding from the Gates Foundation removed financial constraints. To remove policy constraints, A&T, in collaboration with UNICEF and government agencies, developed a national behavior-change communication plan for IYCF with specific goals, targets, responsibilities, and measurement and evaluation (M&E) indicators. BRAC assigned the necessary staff with operational skills to push the scaling-up process forward. A&T's engagement strategy with governmental agencies and the media created political space. Formative research and frequent reviews of field experiences helped ensure that the program reflected cultural sensitivities. Practical yet comprehensive M&E and knowledge sharing processes were established to foster ongoing adjustments."

Source: Excerpted from Haque et al. (2012)

Box A2. Strengthening the capacity of municipal government to fund social enterprises in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The European Union and UN Development Programme (UNDP) have provided long-term support to a program in Bosnia-Herzegovina that is designed to improve local democracy and delivery of public services to local communities by reinforcing the relationship between municipal governments and civil society organizations (CSOs), especially for the purpose of social service delivery by CSO. The program allocates European Union grants under UNDP administration through a competitive process to selected municipalities. The municipalities in turn allocate the funding competitively to CSOs in line with municipal budget priorities. Local governments and CSOs are each expected to co-finance the program. UNDP provides training in the use of the system both for municipal employees and to CSO.

The Reinforcement of Local Democracy program, known as LOD, started in 2009. Its fourth phase ended in May 2016. In early 2016, a new regional program for six West Balkan countries, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, was in an advanced stage of preparation. The need to scale up was recognized early in the program, and the Associations of Municipalities were brought in as a way to scale up horizontally and vertically. Moreover, recently a supportive policy framework was established at the regional level, covering the entire country. As a result of these efforts, the coverage of LOD was extended to 60 of a total of 144 municipalities by early 2016.

Two evaluations are available for two earlier phases of the program. Both recognize the strong performance of the LOD program in terms of (a) implementing an effective and participatory process of fund allocation, (b) strengthening the links between municipal authorities and CSOs, (c) improving the readiness and capacity of local governments to deal effectively with CSOs, and (d) strengthening CSOs' project selection, preparation and implementation capacity. However, both evaluations flag concerns about sustainability of the program: (i) the lack of a national legal and policy framework for the CSO sector; (ii) uncertainty about whether local governments are able and willing to sustain the program without external funding; and (iii) lack of sustainability of the CSO projects funded under the program. Sustainability could also be undermined by potential backlash from politically connected CSOs—sports clubs and war veterans' associations—that traditionally are the main recipients of municipal grants but are less favored under the LOD approach stressing the provision of social services.

A scaling up assessment by one of the authors concluded that overall the LOD program incorporates many important aspects of a systematic scaling up process for local government support to social enterprises. An overall pathway to scale has been pursued on a sustained basis countrywide and regionally, with many of the enabling conditions well taken care of and with effective vertical linkages. Selected scaling up aspects could have been perhaps more systematically pursued (definition of scaling up target, fiscal, and partnership spaces, and M&E with a scaling up lens). For fiscal sustainability, the program likely will have to rely on long-term financial support provided by the European Union as part of its pre-accession assistance program.

Source: Unpublished scaling up assessment by Johannes Linn, February 2016

Box A3. Scaling barriers in primary health care delivery and outreach

As a specific example of the value chain approach to scaling up service delivery, one can consider how the framework of Figure 9 is adapted to the case of primary health care delivery and outreach, as shown below:

- Weak business model
- Weak proposition to customers/producers
- Weak leadership
- Lack of managerial and technical skills
- Lack of capital

- Lack of suitable labor/inputs
- Weak sourcing and distributions channels from/to BoP
- Weak linkage between BoP producers and end demand
- Lack of financing for customers, distributors, and producers
- Lack of support service providers

- Lack of customer, producer, or channel awareness of new market-based solution and appreciation of its benefits
- Lack of market information and industry know-how, e.g., customer insight, business models
- Absence or ineffectiveness of standards, e.g., for quality
- Lack of hard infrastructure

- Inhibitory laws, regulations, and procedures
- Inhibitory taxes and subsidies
- Adverse intervention by politicians or officials

Source: Abridged from full analysis *Koh et al. (2014)*

Box A4. Scaling up mobile phone payment services: M-PESA in Kenya

"The story of M-PESA, the mobile money service in Kenya, presents one of the most celebrated cases of scaled-up development impact and is quite possibly the quickest the world has seen. M-PESA offers a commercially viable business model for serving poor customers where traditional banking falls short. M-PESA overcomes the constraint of access by substituting mobile phone ownership and networks of agents for physical banks; and it allows small-value transfers and minimal fees by encouraging a shift away from cash to electronic money in which simple movements of money incur virtually no transaction costs. The adoption of mobile money by 73 percent of adults in Kenya—where 67 percent of the population lives below 2 dollars a day—suggests that it should be possible to conceive of a world where virtually all poor people are 'banked.'…. Robust internal processes, the setting of targets, and visionary leadership are all identified as important components of success, in which the objective of reaching scale was fully reflected. However, arguably the most ingenious aspect of the business model is the approach to reaching customers through the formation, training, and retention of a cadre of M-PESA agents…. Rather than creating agents from scratch, M-PESA identified existing networks of competent operatives in the Kenyan economy, which they could readily employ…. From a scaling-up perspective, the virtue of this approach was to ensure that delivery could expand swiftly while transaction costs are kept low.

"M-PESA is an example of a hybrid model designed to solve a social problem: a technology developed with financial support from both the multinational corporation, Vodafone, and a challenge fund operated by the UK's Department for International Development; piloting conducted in collaboration with a microfinance institution, Faulu, to deepen understanding of the customer; exemplary customer-driven design, management, and execution, including the formation of a network of trusted agents by M-PESA; new public regulations to ensure no abuse of monopoly power despite a network covering most poor communities; and a further round of innovations by NGOs and social enterprises in response to the changed circumstances of 'banked' poor people.

"The role of the Kenyan government in this case is especially notable. Not only did it look to safeguard the rights and interests of users through consumer protection and market oversight, it also provided a supportive public policy and regulatory environment in which M-PESA could emerge and ultimately flourish. It should be noted that, at the time M-PESA was piloted, no regulations existed for e-money initiatives or for the involvement of mobile phone operators in any kind of financial transactions. The willingness of the government to allow regulation to follow innovation is an integral part of M-PESA's success story."

Source: Excerpted from *Chandy et al. 2013*

Box A5. Pre-school education for Roma children in Serbia

"An estimated 10% of Serbia's school-aged population is Roma. A large share of the Roma population lives in deep poverty and often in isolated settlements. Most Roma children do not receive even a basic education. Only a third of all Roma children complete the eight-year primary cycle. While about 80-90% of children enroll in first grade, only 50% of students enrolled continue after fourth grade. The low level of education perpetuates the cycle of poverty. Reasons for low school attendance are multiple. Low scholastic success in school, a school environment, which is discriminatory and alien to Roma children, and parental attitudes unsupportive to school attendance are important reasons.

"Evaluations have consistently shown that early enrollment of Roma children during pre-school years are the most effective intervention to help Roma children participate successfully in primary school. Throughout the last 10 years, a large number of NGOs helped to support Roma children through pre-school programs, typically provided to Roma children in separate facilities and segregated from other pre-school children. The Roma Education Fund (REF) propagated and supported an integrated model of pre-school enrollment for Roma children, to help assure that Roma children are not taught in separate—and typically lower quality—schools and to help them to become familiar and integrate into the broader Serbian society. A first project was implemented during 2006. It supported a collaboration of preschools, municipalities and the Ministry of Education/National Council of Minorities. Special incentives were provided to schools to accommodate Roma children into pre- schools. NGOs acted as facilitators between schools and Roma communities/parents to help children attend the schools. Municipalities provided resources and actively supported the approach. Concurrently, REF provided policy advice to the Ministry of Education on Roma education issues. In 2007, Serbia made attendance of at least six months of pre-school a requirement for all children prior to being admitted to first grade. The policy decision to make pre-school mandatory was an important step forward but, in itself, not sufficient. The REF continues to work toward assuring that pre-school be taught through integrated programs and that Roma children need special support through facilitators familiar with their culture, to make sure that parents support their attendance. The REF continues to provide funding for integrated programs and special support to Roma children through facilitators.

"The program is a model where important advances were achieved on the policy level, and activities could be transferred from the NGO level to the public system. However, the path of transferring implementation activities from NGOs to public structures did run into difficulties. The National Council of Minorities, which implemented the first project, did not succeed in the follow-up operation in 2007. Half-hearted support due to various ministerial changes, vested interests and weaknesses in human resources are seen as the most important reasons for this failure. The project concept was subsequently revised and the follow-up operation is presently again implemented by NGOs, in direct cooperation with municipalities. The repeated strong implementing role of NGOs is seen as a transitional solution until consensus for the appropriate public implementation structure can be forged and implementation can again be transferred to the public system."

Source: Excepted from Hartmann and Linn (2008a)

Box A6. Scaling up microfinance programs in fragile environments: The case of Afghanistan

"Based on a 2002 joint needs assessment by the Asian Development Bank, UNDP and the World Bank, the World Bank took on the task of supporting the setting up a national apex institution for the development and strengthening of the fragmented microcredit system in Afghanistan. The program consisted of the establishment of a performance-based funding mechanism for individual retail microfinance institutions, technical assistance and training. Over time the funding was intended to shift from predominantly grant financing for retail organizations to loan financing—a goal on which substantial progress was made over the period 2003-2008. The program aimed to achieve national scale and coverage quickly and good progress was made toward that goal, except in the south of the country where insecurity and military conflict made its operation impossible. Resources were channeled through a total of 11 client microfinance institutions (MFIs), the largest of which was the local branch of BRAC, which in 2006 accounted for 80 percent of total borrowers and 60 percent of microloans outstanding.

"One relevant dimension of the Afghanistan microfinance program was that it built explicitly on the experience of a similar apex institution approach that had been broadly successful in the post-conflict conditions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Key elements which carried over to Afghanistan were that:
- Microfinance was identified as a main priority in the reconstruction planning process;
- multi-donor cooperation took place from the beginning;
- a performance-based funding mechanism provided incentives for retail MFIs;
- grant-financed technical assistance and capacity building was a core component of the program;
- the program supported legislative and regulatory reform for the MFI sector (vertical scaling up); and
- the program was designed and managed to stay non-political.

The Afghanistan program therefore represents an example of transnational scaling up.

"While successful overall, the program encountered a number of challenges:
- an inflationary context created difficulties for the microfinance operations;
- the lack [of] or weak infrastructure in the country combined with insecurity and conflict in some parts made access costly, difficult and in some cases, impossible;
- staffing constraints created obstacles;
- religious and cultural sensitivities had to be respected in the design and implementation of the program;
- tensions developed between the goal of quick delivery of resources to microfinance clients on the one hand and the strengthening of institutional capacity on the other; and
- tensions also developed between the objective of achieving social development goals through microfinance activities versus the development of a financially sound and self-sustaining micro-finance system."

Source: Excepted from Chandy and Linn (2011)

Box A7. Two examples of sequencing horizontal and vertical scaling up

Microfinance in Rwanda

"In 1997, an NGO known as World Relief launched a microcredit program in the aftermath of the genocide. It quickly emerged as a leading MFI in Rwanda, known for its quality services to economically marginalized communities, especially women, who comprised 90 to 94 percent of its clients. Despite its reputation and brand name, however, it struggled to meet the demand for microfinance services; in response, the Government of Rwanda launched a series of reforms to strengthen the sector, and Urwego became formally recognized as a regulated MFI in 2004. By 2007, it had merged with a bank to form the current Urwego Opportunity Bank, the largest MFI in the country, and has recently partnered with UNDP/UNCDF as well as the Government of Rwanda to build an inclusive financial sector in the country."

Rural energy development in Nepal

"REDP [Rural Energy Development Program] began as a local pilot initiative in 1996 that was replicated in 10 districts by 1998 and 15 by 2000 through a decentralized, community-based approach. A number of enabling policies in 2001, as well as various institutional changes to the governing agency, facilitated further expansion of the model to 40 districts by 2007 and all 65 districts by 2012. The program has benefited more than one million people, and has led to increased household incomes due to electricity access, decreased household spending rates on energy and increased spending on education."

Source: Excerpted from UNDP (2013)

Box A8. Lessons from scaling up an NGO education solution in Kenya

"[A] fascinating experiment in Kenya test[ed] the government's ability to implement and scale up an NGO intervention of proven effectiveness: a contract teacher program. The government was unable to replicate the success achieved by World Vision when it took responsibility for selecting, paying, and monitoring contract teachers. Since the government is the dominant actor in Kenya's education sector and the only party capable of scaling up education policies, this collaboration between the NGO and government failed to produce a truly scalable model.... During the implementation of the contract teacher program, the government faced resistance from the teachers' union and committed to hiring all contract teachers into the regular civil service at the end of their contracts—... a possible cause of the intervention's failure. This case study is a reminder that scalable models are not just large, replicated pilots but often have their own unique characteristics. However, the experiment is one of the first to show how controlled trials can be used to inform a scaling-up operation, using similar techniques to those used to evaluate pilot interventions."

Source: Excerpted from Chandy et al. 2013

Box A9. Performance incentives under the Afghanistan Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) program

"Under the BPHS, actual health service delivery is contracted to NGOs and private actors, based on a bidding process facilitated by the three main donors (USAID, European Commission, World Bank) that results in signed, time-limited 'Performance-based Partnership agreements'. NGOs are selected competitively, with credible sanctions in case of poor performance. Although the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) remains responsible for health service delivery in some provinces, its primary role is to develop strategies, goals and objectives, set indicators, and to monitor, supervise and control the performance of the implementing partners. By giving NGOs a fair degree of autonomy but holding them accountable for achieving national priorities, the MoPH has addressed serious constraints, such as scarce human resources, lack of physical facilities and logistical challenges. Carrying out regular, independent and rigorous M&E of health sector performance is expensive. However, it has allowed MoPH to identify problems, act quickly to resolve them and track whether progress has actually been achieved. Around 30 NGOs are involved countrywide in delivering BPHS services through vertical programs. As of 2005, approximately 70 percent of districts were covered by the BPHS, providing primary health care to 50 percent of the afghan population. Between 2002 and 2007, there was a 136 percent increase in the number of functioning primary health care facilities from 496 to 1,169. The health management information system indicates that there has been nearly a four-fold increase in the number of outpatient visits from 2004 to 2007. Independent assessments confirm that the quality of health care and health outcomes have also improved significantly over the period, despite a worsening security situation."

Source: Excerpted from Chandy and Linn 2011

ANNEX 1: SCALABILITY ASSESSMENT TOOL

Model Categories		A ☺✓	← Scaling up is easier	B ☺✓	Scaling up is harder →	C ☹
A. Is the model credible?	1		Based on sound evidence		Little or no solid evidence	
	2		Independent external evaluation		No independent external evaluation	
	3		There is evidence that the model works in diverse social contexts		There is no evidence that the model works in diverse social contexts	
	4		The model is supported by eminent individuals and institutions		The model is supported by few or no eminent individuals and institutions	
B. How observable are the model's results?	5		The impact is very visible to casual observation tangible		The impact is not very visible, not easily communicated to public	
	6		Clearly associated with the intervention		Not clearly associated with the intervention	
	7		Evidence and documentation exists with clear emotional appeal		Currently little or no evidence with clear emotional appeal	
C. How relevant is the model?	8		Addresses an objectively significant, persistent problem		Addresses a problem which affects few people or has limited impact	
	9		Addresses an issue which is currently high on the policy agenda		Addresses an issue which is low or invisible on the policy agenda	
	10		Addresses a need which is sharply felt by potential beneficiaries		Addresses a need which is not sharply felt by potential beneficiaries	
D. Does the model have relative advantage over existing practices?	11		Current solutions for this issue are considered inadequate		Current solutions are considered adequate	
	12		Superior effectiveness to other innovative models established		Little or no objective evidence of superiority to current solutions	
	13		Superior effectiveness to other innovative models established		Superior effectiveness to other innovative models not established	
E. Is the model credible?	14		Implementable within existing systems, infrastructure		Requires new or additional systems, infrastructure, or human resources	
	15		Contains a few components easily added onto existing systems		In a complete or comprehensive package of multiple components	
	16		Small departure from current practices and behaviors of *target population*		Large departure from current practices and behaviors *for target population*	
	17		Small departure from current practices and cultures of *adopting organization(s)*		Large departure from current practices and cultures of *adopting organization(s)*	
	18		Few decision makers are involved in agreeing to adoption of the model		Many decision makers are involved in agreeing to adoption	
	19		Demonstrated effectiveness in **diverse** organization settings		Demonstrated effectiveness **in only one** organization setting	
	20		The model in not particularly value or process intensive		Process and/or values are an important component of the model	
	21		Low technical sophistication of the components and activities of the model		High technical sophistication of the components and activities of the model	
	22		Key innovation is clear and easily replicated *technology*, e.g. vaccine		Focus of the model is not a *technology* or one which is not easily replicated	
	23		Low complexity; simple with few components and easily added on to existing systems		High complexity with many components; integrated package	
	24		Includes little supervision and monitoring		Includes substantial supervision and monitoring for implementation	
F. How testable is the model?	25		Able to be tested by users on a limited scale		Unable to be tested without complete adoption at a large scale	
G. Is there a sustainable source of funding?	26		Superior *cost-effectiveness* to existing or other solutions clearly established		Little evidence of superiority in terms of *cost-effectiveness*	
	27		Requires a large commitment of funds at scale		Requires a small absolute commitment of funds at scale	
	28		The model itself has its own internal funding (e.g., user fees) or endowment		No internal funding; the model is dependent on external funding source	
Total number of checks						

Source: *Reproduce from Cooley and Ved (2012)*

ANNEX 2: DRIVERS AND SPACES/CONSTRAINTS ALONG THE SCALING UP PATHWAY

Drivers for scaling up

Forces, or "drivers," are needed to push the scaling up process forward along a pathway. One can distinguish seven sets of common drivers:

- *Ideas and models*: **There has to be an idea or model that works at a small scale. These may emerge** from research or practice. The attraction of the idea or model may drive diffusion. Spontaneous **diffusion happens, but more often other drivers are needed to ensure scaling up.**

- *Vision*: A vision is needed to recognize that scaling up of an idea is necessary, desirable, and feasible.

- *Leadership and champions*: Visionary leaders or champions (individuals or groups) often drive the scaling up process forward.

- *Market or community demand*: **Whenever strong** demand is present, either from consumers for private goods or from communities for public goods, scaling up is more readily implemented.

- *Incentives and accountability*: Incentives are key to driving the behavior of actors and institutions in order for sustained scaling up to be possible. These incentives include rewards, competition, and pressure through the political process, along **with peer reviews and evaluations. Monitoring** and evaluation against goals, benchmarks, and performance metrics are essential ingredients to establish incentives and accountability.

- *External catalysts*: Political and economic crises or pressure from outside actors (donors, NGOs, market or community demand, and so on) may drive the scaling up process forward.

- *Other drivers*: **Depending on the nature of the in**tervention and the local or national context, other drivers may be at work or have to be created.

Spaces (or barriers) for scaling up

For successful scaling up, potential barriers need to be removed, and enabling conditions, otherwise known as "spaces," have to be created for interventions to grow. The following spaces have been identifies as of principal importance when pursuing a scaling up pathway:

- *Fiscal/financial/cost space*: Fiscal and financial resources need to be mobilized to support the scaled up intervention, or the costs of the intervention need to be adapted to fit into the available fiscal/financial space.

- *Political/ownership space*: **Important stakeholders, both those in support and those against the intervention, need to be attended to through out**reach and suitable safeguards to ensure political support for and ownership of a scaling up process.

- *Policy space*: The policy, legal, and regulatory **framework has to allow for, or be adapted to sup**port, scaling up.

- *Institutional/organizational/staff capacity space*: The capacity for institutional and organizational resources has to be created in order to carry the scaling up process forward.

- *Natural resource/environmental space*: The impact of the intervention on natural resources and the environment must be considered. Harmful effects of scaling up on natural resources and the environment must be mitigated, and the benefits of scaling up for natural resources and the environment should be promoted.

- *Cultural space*: Possible cultural obstacles or support mechanisms need to be identified, and the intervention needs to be suitably adapted in order to permit scaling up in a culturally diverse environment.

- *Security space*: In fragile and conflict-affected states (or situations, such as conflict-affected regions or crime-ridden city areas), lack of security is likely to be a major obstacle to successful and sustained scaling up. Therefore, creating space will be an important determinant for the scaling up pathway in such settings.

- *Partnership space*: Partners need to be mobilized to join in the effort of scaling up.

- *Other spaces/barriers*: Depending on the nature of the intervention and the local or national context, other spaces may have to be created or barriers removed (e.g., social space for community or women's empowerment and participation)

Source: *Hartmann and Linn (2008a), Linn et al. (2010), Chandy and Linn (2011), and Cooley and Linn (2014)*

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